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Abstract 
We investigate the role of national culture in corporate risk-taking. We postulate that culture influences 
corporate risk-taking both through its effect on managerial decision-making and through its effect on a 
country’s formal institutions. Further, we postulate that the influence of culture is conditioned on the 
extent of managerial discretion as measured by earnings discretion and firm size. Using firm-level data 
from 35 countries and employing a hierarchical linear modeling approach to isolate the effects of firm-
level and country-level variables, we show that individualism has a positive and significant association, 
whereas uncertainty avoidance and harmony have negative and significant associations, with corporate 
risk-taking. Greater earnings discretion strengthens and larger firm size weakens the association of culture 
with corporate risk-taking. We conclude that even in a highly globalized world with sophisticated 
managers, culture matters. 
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risk-taking; uncertainty avoidance   
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Abstract 
 
We investigate the role of national culture in corporate risk-taking. We postulate that culture influences 
corporate risk-taking both through its effect on managerial decision-making and through its effect on a 
country’s formal institutions. Further, we postulate that the influence of culture is conditioned on the 
extent of managerial discretion as measured by earnings discretion and firm size. Using firm-level data 
from 35 countries and employing a hierarchical linear modeling approach to isolate the effects of firm-
level and country-level variables, we show that individualism has a positive and significant association, 
whereas uncertainty avoidance and harmony have negative and significant associations, with corporate 
risk-taking. Greater earnings discretion strengthens and larger firm size weakens the association of culture 
with corporate risk-taking. We conclude that even in a highly globalized world with sophisticated 
managers, culture matters. 
 
Keywords: earnings discretion; formal institutions; harmony; individualism; national culture; corporate 
risk-taking; uncertainty avoidance   
JEL Classification: G18; G31; G32 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate risk-taking is fundamental to firm performance and survival. In this paper, we examine whether 
and how the combination of national culture and managerial discretion influences corporate risk-taking. 
There is a substantial prior literature drawing from agency theories on the relation between managerial 
incentives and corporate risk-taking (see, for example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and Low 
(2009)). However, the focus on the incentives of individual managers overlooks the cultural context in 
which managers make decisions. Our paper fills this void and makes the following contributions to the 
finance and accounting literature. First, we postulate specific economic and psychological channels 
through which three specific cultural values (individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and harmony), may 
exert their influences on risky corporate decision-making. Second, we demonstrate that these cultural 
values matter in corporate risk-taking, controlling for formal institutions and economic development 
across countries. Finally, we establish boundary conditions on the influence of culture in corporate 
decisions by testing whether cultural effects are more apparent in firms with greater earnings discretion 
and smaller firms. Our paper and its findings reinforce the growing awareness among finance and 
accounting scholars that along with formal institutions such as investor protection (see, for example, 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) and John, Litov, and Yeung (2008)), informal institutions such as 
culture also matter in corporate decisions, even when those decisions are made by sophisticated 
professional managers in a globalized environment (see, for example, Hail and Leuz (2006), Shao, Kwok, 
and Guedhami (2010), Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin (2011), and Giannetti and Yafeh (2012)). 
Using cultural values developed by Hofstede (1980, 2001) and Schwartz (1994, 2004), we 
examine whether between-country differences in adherence to the important cultural values of 
individualism (versus collectivism), uncertainty avoidance, and harmony (versus mastery) affect 
corporate risk-taking.  Cultures high on individualism emphasize individual freedom and achievement, 
whereas cultures low on individualism emphasize strong group cohesion. Cultures high on uncertainty 
avoidance shun ambiguous situations and prefer clear rules of conduct, whereas cultures low on 
uncertainty avoidance enjoy novel events and value innovation. Cultures high on harmony emphasize 
accepting matters as they are, whereas cultures low on harmony emphasize the importance of 
assertiveness to advance personal or group interests. We hypothesize that there is a positive relation 
between national individualism and corporate risk-taking, a negative relation between national uncertainty 
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avoidance and corporate risk-taking, and a negative relation between national harmony and corporate 
risk-taking.  Furthermore, we hypothesize that the influence of culture is conditioned on the degree of 
managerial discretion (as proxied by earnings discretion and firm size).  
We empirically examine these hypotheses using industrial firms from 35 countries covered by the 
Compustat Global Vantage database over the period 1997-2006. Using the standard deviation of operating 
income and R&D expenditures as our measures of corporate risk-taking, we show that there is a positive 
association between individualism and risk-taking, a negative association between uncertainty avoidance 
and risk-taking, and a negative association between harmony and risk-taking, controlling for firm-level 
and country-level characteristics, including measures of formal institutions and economic development. 
Furthermore, we show that the influence of culture is conditioned on certain firm environments: Greater 
earnings discretion strengthens, while larger firm size weakens, the effects of culture on corporate risk-
taking. Finally, we report evidence consistent with our conjecture that culture influences formal 
institutional development, which in turn influences the riskiness of corporate decision-making. These 
indirect effects are sometimes consistent in sign and reinforcing, while at other times are opposite in sign 
and offsetting, the direct effects of culture. Nevertheless, we find the total effects of each cultural value on 
corporate risk-taking to be in the hypothesized direction and of economic importance.  
We implement additional investigations to ensure our results are robust.  First, we address the 
endogeneity concern about culture by employing the instrumental variable approach. We show that the 
main effects of culture on corporate risk-taking largely remain. Second, we employ a panel data with 
three cross-sections and a lead-lag specification and show that the relations between cultural values and 
corporate risk-taking are largely unaffected. Third, we add firm-level leverage and country-level financial 
structure variables to the baseline specification and show that the main effects of culture on risk-taking 
remain. Finally, we include two additional cultural values—Hofstede’s power distance and masculinity—
to the baseline model and show that most of the effects of individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and 
harmony remain, while these two additional cultural values are not significantly associated with corporate 
risk-taking.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We review the related literature and present 
our theoretical framework and empirical hypotheses in the next section. Section 3 describes key variable 
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construction and our sample. Section 4 presents the empirical specification. Section 5 presents our main 
results and provides some interpretation. Section 6 considers alternative specifications and implements 
some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Prior Literature 
Our paper builds on the strand of literature examining corporate risk-taking in an international 
setting. Claessens, Djankov, and Nenova (2000) employ twelve indicators to capture corporate risk-
taking, including measures of cash-flow risk, financial leverage, and liquidity. They show that companies 
in common law countries, countries with stronger protection of property rights, and those in market-based 
financial systems take less risk. John et al. (2008) focus on the relation between investor protection and 
corporate risk-taking. Using a large panel of manufacturing companies, they show significant positive 
associations between measures of investor protection and risk taking, and between risk taking and growth. 
Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011) show that having strong creditor rights in a country leads firms to 
reduce risk, measured by the undertaking of diversifying acquisitions, lower cash-flow risk, and lower 
leverage. Bridging firm-level and country-level formal institution determinants of corporate risk-taking, 
Laeven and Levine (2009) examine how risk taking by banks is influenced by their ownership structures 
and national banking regulations. They find that banks with more powerful (controlling) owners tend to 
take greater risks, consistent with theories predicting that shareholders have stronger incentives to 
increase risk than non-shareholding managers and creditors. In this paper, we go beyond formal 
institutions by adding culture as an informal institution and examining its effect on corporate risk-taking.  
 
Our Theoretical Framework 
Our fundamental proposition is that even in a globalized business environment, national culture 
operates on corporate risk-taking both directly through managerial decision making and indirectly through 
firm- and country-level characteristics. Prior research has distinguished three levels at which culture has 
its influence: country level (national formal institutions, including laws, regulations, and market 
development), firm level (compensation practices and ownership), and individual level (managerial 
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attitude to risk, including a focus on payoffs versus risk and subjective discount rates).1  Due to data 
limitations, our empirical analysis focuses on the first two levels of influence.                                       
Country-level influences 
Countries differ in the type and level of formal institutions they provide to regulate and facilitate 
corporate risk-taking (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998)). Formal institutions 
such as investor protection, rule of law, and market development have been shown to increase the level of 
corporate risk-taking within a country (John et al. (2008) and Acharya et al. (2011)).  
Following Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2005, 2007) and Kwok and Tadesse (2006), we 
argue that these formal institutions are shaped by national cultural values, including individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, and harmony.2 These three values are taken from the two most prominent 
psychological theories of cultural differences: Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cultural dimensions and 
Schwartz’s (1994, 2004) cultural value orientations. 
Because individualistic societies emphasize individual freedom, autonomy, and self-interested 
competition, they require formal institutions that protect the rights of competing parties (Licht et al. 
(2005)). For example, investor protection ensures that capital providers—shareholders and creditors—
receive their deserved returns on their investments. By contrast, collectivist societies emphasize strong 
informal ties among in-groups and rely on informal networks and relationships rather than formal 
institutions to protect against opportunism (Li and Zahra (2012)).  
Meanwhile, uncertainty avoidant societies emphasize social conformity and rule following; their 
members are therefore less comfortable with (equity) market-based financial systems characterized by 
uncertainty and ambiguity (Kwok and Tadesse (2006)). By contrast, members of low uncertainty avoidant 
societies are more comfortable with unpredictable outcomes, and therefore are more accepting of market-
based financial systems (Kwok and Tadesse (2006), Beckmann et al. (2008), and Li and Zahra (2012)). 
                                                 
1 Because it is impossible to cleanly separate culture from a country’s economic, legal, political, and geographic 
legacy (Licht (2001)), in this paper we treat culture as a parsimonious and proximal measure of a country’s history, 
which is consistent with the approach of major cultural theorists, such as Hofstede and Schwartz. 
2 Both Hofstede (1980, 2001) and Schwartz (1994, 2004) acknowledge that cultural values are themselves shaped by 
economic conditions, although they argue that cultural changes are very slow, in an order of centuries, thus 
minimizing the risk of reverse causality. We discuss the relevance of this possible simultaneity between cultural and 
formal institutions when interpreting our results. 
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As an illustration, Kwok and Tadesse (2006) show that Germany, high in uncertainty avoidance, has an 
economy dominated by its banking system, while the US, lower in uncertainty avoidance, has an 
economy dominated by equity-market financing. 
Further, harmonious societies emphasize accepting the world as it is, so their members are 
uncomfortable with conflict and assertiveness, and thus are less supportive of a market-based financial 
system that encourages direct conflict to advance personal and group interests (Licht et al. (2007)). By 
contrast, members of low harmony (high mastery) societies are more comfortable with institutions that 
encourage people to stand up for their rights, even to the extent of exploiting others. As an illustration, 
Italy has the highest score in harmony, while Israel has the lowest score in harmony. 
Based on the above discussion, we expect that individualism is positively, and uncertainty 
avoidance and harmony are negatively, related to formal institutional development—especially market-
based financial systems—which in turn encourages corporate risk-taking (see John et al. (2008) and 
Acharya et al. (2011) for supporting evidence, but also see Claessens et al. (2000) for some evidence to 
the contrary). Unlike prior work, we consider both country- and firm-level determinants of corporate risk-
taking, using a hierarchical linear model with the hope of resolving prior mixed evidence.   
Countries also differ in the relative protection they offer to shareholders and creditors (La Porta et 
al. (1997, 1998) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008)). This difference is 
relevant to corporate risk-taking because, in a modern limited liability corporation, there are intrinsic 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors: The former enjoy the upside potential and hence 
are more risk-seeking (Galai and Masulis (1976) and Myers (1977)), while the latter receive fixed payoffs 
and hence are more risk-averse. Given that high uncertainty avoidant societies are less supportive of 
market-based financial practices, we expect less shareholder protection in these societies, which in turn 
discourages corporate risk-taking (John et al. (2008)). Similarly, given that high harmony societies are 
less comfortable with open conflict, we expect less shareholder protection in these societies, which in turn 
discourages corporate risk-taking (Licht et al. (2007)). 
Firm-level influences 
Standard agency theories suggest that managers are more risk-averse than shareholders because 
of their career concerns and lack of diversification (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Demsetz and Lehn 
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(1985)). In response, many corporate boards have instituted equity-based compensation schemes to align 
the risk preferences of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Haugen and Senbet 
(1981)). A number of US-based studies have demonstrated that equity-based pay encourages managerial 
risk-taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), Coles et al. (2006), Sanders and Hambrick (2007), and Low 
(2009)).3 Individualism, which emphasizes individual freedom and self-interest, is consistent with the 
practice of equity-based managerial compensation (Schuler and Rogovsky (1998), Tosi and Greckhamer 
(2004), and Bryan, Nash, and Patel (2012)). By contrast, uncertainty avoidance—which emphasizes 
avoiding situations characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity—is inconsistent with this practice 
(Schuler and Rogovsky (1998), Tosi and Greckhamer (2004), and Bryan et al. (2012)).  Similarly, 
harmony—which emphasizes avoiding conflict and self-assertion—is also inconsistent with the practice 
of equity-based pay (Bryan et al. (2012)). Given that this firm-level equity-based compensation practice is 
more common in high individualism, low uncertainty avoidance, and low harmony countries, we expect 
greater corporate risk-taking by firms in these countries. Due to data limitations, we do not directly 
observe this channel of influence. 4  
Individual-level influences 
Psychological research has identified a number of reasons for expecting differences in risk-taking 
across national cultures. First, individualistic managers are free to make risky decisions using their own 
judgment (Kreiser et al. (2010)), and are motivated to stand out from other managers to demonstrate their 
autonomy. This leads to their use of decision rules that overweight risky payoffs, relative to less 
individualistic managers. Second, individualistic managers, because of their self-enhancing belief that 
they are more skilled and have a higher level of outcome control than other managers (Sedikides, 
Gaertner, and Toguchi (2003) and Yamaguchi et al. (2005)), underestimate the level of uncertainty in 
risky decisions. This leads to their use of decision rules that require a lower risk premium (i.e., a lower 
discount rate) for risky projects, relative to less individualistic managers. Due to the influences of both 
                                                 
3 Several papers challenge the generality of this link between equity-based pay and corporate risk-taking, notably 
Lewellen (2006). She shows that there are considerable volatility costs associated with equity-based pay that may 
reduce managerial incentives for risk-taking. 
4 There is almost no large-scale cross-country comparison of compensation practices across countries due to data 
limitations. Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2013) is a notable exception, with pay data for top executives 
in 14 countries for the year 2006. 
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managerial autonomy and self-enhancement, we expect that individualism is positively related to 
corporate risk-taking. 
Hofstede (1991, p. 112) defines uncertainty avoidance as the “extent to which the members of a 
culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.” In a later paper, Hofstede (2001, p. 148) 
emphasizes that “uncertainty avoidance does not equal risk avoidance.” Low uncertainty avoidant 
managers are comfortable with the unpredictability and ambiguity inherent in innovative projects, for 
which there are no rules to fall back on.  By contrast, high uncertainty avoidant managers feel anxious in 
the presence of uncertainty and ambiguity and hence will either avoid innovative projects or require a 
higher risk premium (i.e., a higher discount rate, Li and Zahra (2012)). Thus, we expect that uncertainty 
avoidance is negatively related to corporate risk-taking. 
Low harmony managers are comfortable with the change and conflict that are part of innovative 
projects. By contrast, high harmony managers passively accept the status quo and avoid conflict, and 
hence will either avoid innovative projects or require a higher risk premium. Thus, we expect that 
harmony is negatively related to corporate risk-taking. 
In summary, based on the three levels of influence outlined above, our first three hypotheses 
regarding the effects of cultural values on corporate risk-taking are as follows:  
H1: There is a positive association between national levels of individualism and firm-level corporate 
risk-taking. 
H2: There is a negative association between national levels of uncertainty avoidance and firm-level 
corporate risk-taking. 
H3: There is a negative association between national levels of harmony and firm-level corporate risk-
taking. 
 
The Roles of Earnings Discretion and Firm Size 
Previous studies have shown that formal institutions and culture operate both independently and 
in combination on finance and accounting decisions. Hope (2003) shows that Hofstede’s cultural values 
behave differently across different legal regimes (common law versus civil law) when the dependent 
variable is firm-level disclosure quality. Han et al. (2010) find that the interactions between investor 
protection and individualism, and between investor protection and uncertainty avoidance, are associated 
with the magnitude of earnings discretion. Li and Zahra (2012) show that supportive formal institutions 
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have a positive effect on venture capital activity, but this effect is weakened in high uncertainty avoidant 
societies and in more collectivist societies. Unlike this prior work, we focus on the interaction between 
firm-level environments and culture on corporate risk-taking. 
In settings where managers have greater discretion, we expect cultural values to have a greater 
influence on corporate risk-taking. By contrast, in settings where managers are more constrained by rules, 
we expect cultural values to have a limited influence on corporate risk-taking. Specifically, we expect 
firms engaged in extensive earnings discretion to have greater managerial discretion (Han et al. (2010)), 
and hence such firms should show stronger evidence of the effect of cultural values on corporate risk-
taking. Further, we expect cultural values to have a weaker influence on large firms because large firms 
rely more on highly controlled management systems, including better corporate governance practices. For 
example, Hope (2003) shows that larger firms are associated with higher quality disclosure, and Han et al. 
(2010) find that larger firms engage in less earnings discretion. 
Thus, our fourth and fifth hypotheses regarding the moderating effects of certain firm 
environments on the relation between cultural values and corporate risk-taking are as follows:   
H4: The influences of culture are strengthened in firms with greater managerial discretion as proxied by 
greater earnings discretion. 
H5: The influences of culture are weakened in firms with stricter internal controls as proxied by larger 
firm size. 
 
3. Key Variable Construction and Our Sample 
Measures of Cultural Values 
Two of the three cultural values we use in this paper—individualism and uncertainty avoidance— 
are constructed from the worldwide sample obtained by Hofstede (1980, 2001); see Appendix I for details. 
The third cultural value—harmony—is constructed from the worldwide sample obtained by Schwartz 
(1994, 2004); see Appendix I for details. The Hofstede value dimensions were derived from a sample of 
IBM employees in the 1970s, and the Schwartz value dimensions were derived from a sample of teachers 
mainly in the 1990s, well before the beginning of our sample period, thereby reducing endogeneity 
concerns. Licht et al. (2005) note that cultural values change very slowly, perhaps on the order of 
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centuries. Nonetheless, any changes in cultural values that have occurred over the past forty years would 
weaken our conjectured linkage between cultural values and corporate decisions. Similarly, if IBM 
employees or teachers did not share the same cultural values as corporate managers, this dissimilarity 
would also weaken the conjectured linkage between culture and corporate risk-taking. Finding robust 
effects of cultural values on corporate risk-taking would support the general thesis that cultural values are 
enduring norms or guidelines that are widely shared within nations.  
 
Measures of Corporate Risk-Taking 
Motivated by prior work, we employ two measures of corporate risk-taking.  Std(ROA) is the 
degree of risk-taking in firms’ operations measured by the volatility of corporate earningsriskier 
corporate operations lead to more volatile earnings (John et al. (2008) and Zhang (2009)). For each firm 
with available earnings and total assets for at least five years over the 1997-2006 period, we compute the 
deviation of the firm’s EBITDA/total assets from the country average for the corresponding year. We then 
calculate the standard deviation of this measure for each firm.  
Our second measure is R&D, which is commonly employed as a measure of risky corporate 
policies (Bhagat and Welch (1995), Coles et al. (2006), and Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter (2010)). R&D 
investments are risky because they have a low probability of success and their benefits are distant and 
uncertain. R&D is constructed as the average ratio of R&D expenditures over total assets for the period 
1997-2006.5  
In brief, our first measure of risk-taking captures the overall risk taken by the firm, and our 
second measure captures risk-taking in long-term corporate investment, with each firm providing a single 
value for each measure over the ten-year sample period. 
 
Measures of Investor Protection and Economic/Institutional Development 
To characterize investor protection in each country, we use four measures. First, the anti-self-
dealing index is a measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate 
                                                 
5 In our main specification, we treat firm-year observations with missing R&D expenditures as having zero 
expenditure. It is worth noting that our main findings remain unchanged if we drop those firm-year observations 
with missing R&D expenditures (results available upon request). 
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insiders. This measure is constructed by Djankov et al. (2008) with a focus on private enforcement 
mechanisms such as disclosure, approval, and litigation.6 Second, rule of law is an indicator of the 
effectiveness of regulatory enforcement. The data on rule of law are taken from La Porta et al. (1998).  
Third, the disclosure index is a measure of the quality of firm annual reports, including balance sheets and 
income statements. The disclosure data are also retrieved from La Porta et al. (1998), who tabulate the 
original data from the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research. Fourth, the creditor rights 
index is the sum of four provisions: the absence of an automatic stay in reorganization, the requirement 
for creditors’ consent or the minimum dividend required for a debtor to file for reorganization, the 
ranking of secured creditors first in reorganization, and the removal of incumbent management upon 
filing for reorganization. The data on creditor rights are taken from La Porta et al. (1998).  
Finally, we include four indicators of economic and institutional development: country GDP per 
capita, country private credit, country market capitalization, and country GDP growth volatility, obtained 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Appendix I provides a detailed description of all 
variables. 
 
Sample Overview 
Our main data source is the Compustat Global Vantage database for the period 1997-2006. The 
sample is chosen based on the requirement that firm-level data are available to compute our risk-taking 
measures, and country-level data are available for cultural values and key country characteristics. To 
remove the effect of outliers, we winsorize all firm-level variables at the one percent level in both tails of 
the distribution. Our final sample consists of 7,250 firm-level observations from 35 countries.  
It is worth noting that we only examine manufacturing firms in our study, for the following 
reasons. First, the manufacturing firms are fairly evenly distributed across our sample countries, while 
firms from most other industries either have spotty representation across countries (such as finance and 
construction), or are heavily regulated (such as public utilities). Second, the distribution of industries 
                                                 
6 It is worth noting that our main result on shareholder protection is not affected if we use La Porta et al.’s (1998) 
anti-director rights index. Further, all four investor protection variables are directly associated with a country’s legal 
origin, as shown by La Porta et al. (1998).  To avoid multicollinearity, we opt not to include the legal origin 
variables in our model specification.   
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itself is very likely driven by country-level variables, including culture. Focusing on one industry—
manufacturing—mitigates the concern that culture also matters in cross-country industry distribution. 
Lastly, prior work that examines corporate risk-taking tends to focus on specific industries (see for 
example, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) on oil and gas producers, John et al. (2008) on manufacturing 
firms, and Laeven and Levine (2009) on banks). In all our model specifications we include two-digit 
industry fixed effects to control for cross-country differences in industry concentration and their effects 
on corporate risk-taking (we do not report those coefficients in the interests of brevity).  
Table 1 Panel A provides a summary of our sample. The number of firms included per country 
varies from 10 firms (Peru) to 1,659 (Japan). We show that among our 35 countries, the three countries 
with the highest score on individualism are: the US (0.91), Australia (0.90), and the UK (0.89); while the 
three countries with the lowest score on individualism are: Peru (0.16), Taiwan (0.17), and South Korea 
(0.18).  The three countries with the highest score on uncertainty avoidance are: Greece (1.12), Portugal 
(1.04), and Belgium (0.94); while the four countries with the lowest score on uncertainty avoidance are: 
Singapore (0.08), Denmark (0.23), Hong Kong (0.29), and Sweden (0.29). The three countries with the 
highest score on harmony are: Italy (4.90), Germany (4.70), and Greece (4.69); while the three countries 
with the lowest score on harmony are: Israel (3.35), South Korea (3.56), and Hong Kong (3.61). 
Table 1 Panel B provides the summary statistics for firm-level variables.  The mean (median) 
values for our two risk-taking measures—std(ROA), and R&D—are 6.20 percent (4.68 percent), and 2.83 
percent (0.58 percent), respectively. 
Table 1 Panel C presents the Pearson correlations between the dependent and independent 
variables using firm-level observations. We show that there is a positive correlation between our two 
measures of corporate risk-taking, a negative correlation between individualism and uncertainty 
avoidance, and between individualism and harmony, and a strong positive association between 
uncertainty avoidance and harmony.  
Among our eight investor protection and economic/institutional development variables, we find 
significant pair-wise correlations for almost all pairs. In particular, there is a strong positive correlation 
between the anti-self-dealing index and disclosure, a strong positive correlation between the anti-self-
dealing index and market capitalization, a strong positive correlation between rule of law and GDP per 
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capita, a strong negative correlation between rule of law and GDP growth volatility, a positive correlation 
between disclosure and market capitalization, a positive correlation between  GDP per capita and private 
credit, and a strong negative correlation between GDP per capita and GDP growth volatility.  
Between the three cultural values and eight country-level institutional variables, we first show 
that there are significant pair-wise correlations among all pairs. Most notably, there is a strong positive 
correlation between individualism and rule of law, a positive correlation between individualism and GDP 
per capita, and a strong negative correlation between individualism and GDP growth volatility. There is a 
strong negative correlation between uncertainty avoidance and the anti-self-dealing index, a strong 
negative correlation between uncertainty avoidance and disclosure, and a strong negative correlation 
between uncertainty avoidance and market capitalization. There is also a strong negative association 
between harmony and the anti-self-dealing index. The significant correlations between cultural values and 
measures of formal institutions are consistent with Hope (2003) and Licht et al. (2005, 2007), who argue 
that a country’s corporate governance practices and legal standards reflect its national culture background.  
 
4. Our Empirical Specifications 
Multilevel Data and Hierarchical Linear Models 
Our data structure is multilevel. At the country level, we have firms from 35 different countries. 
At the firm level, we have over 7,000 firms. From a modeling perspective, it is important to distinguish 
the effects that take place at the country level from those that take place at the individual firm level, both 
to understand the role of country- versus firm-level determinants, and to appropriately model their 
interactions. 
We employ a hierarchical nested form of the general linear model to explore our multilevel data 
(see Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) or Goldstein (2003) for an introduction to hierarchical linear models 
(HLM)). In our data, the set of firms within countries form the base-level observations, while countries 
serve as the higher-level observations.  
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There are three distinct benefits from using an HLM in our setting. First, the HLM framework 
using a country mean-centered approach to firm-level variables cleanly separates the variance in firm-
level risk-taking into what is determined by the firm- versus country-level explanatory variables.  
Second, the HLM framework corrects for the distortion introduced by varying sample sizes across 
countries. Under the OLS specification, it is common for the coefficient on a country-level variable to be 
spuriously significant simply because of the large sample size at the firm level. This problem is 
accentuated when countries differ markedly in the number of firms they contribute to the sample. Unlike 
the OLS regression where each firm-level observation receives equal weight, the HLM regression 
simultaneously models regressions at both the firm-level and the country-level; with the country-level 
regression weighted by the precision of the firm-level data, which is inversely related to the sample size 
within a country.  
Third, and finally, the HLM framework accurately incorporates cross-level interactions between 
the firm- and country-level variables. The power of HLMs comes from their ability to correctly pool firm-
level effects across countries while also examining country-level relations.  
 
Mean-Centering the Data 
We pre-process the data to help decompose the country- and firm-level variations in corporate 
risk-taking. First, for each country-level independent variable, we center by its grand mean (averaged 
across countries), so that every transformed variable has a mean of zero, and we add the suffix “_ctry” to 
each of these variables. Second, for each firm-level independent variable, we center by its grand mean 
(averaged across firms and countries), so that every transformed variable has a mean of zero. Third, we 
create country-level mean values (averaged within a country) on those grand-mean-centered variables in 
step 2 and add the suffix “_ctrymean” to each of these variables. Finally, we create within-country 
residuals by taking the grand-mean adjusted variables in step 2 and subtracting the corresponding within-
country means in step 3. We name these firm-level deviations separately from their corresponding 
country-level means by adding the suffix “_firmdev.”  
By centering the firm-level variables within-country and adding the country-level means to the 
set of predictors, we completely separate the covariances within- and between-country (Raudenbush and 
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Bryk (2002)).  Furthermore, this decomposition allows us to explore the potentially differential effects of 
firm characteristics such as earnings discretion at the (individual) firm- and (average) country-level. 
Finally, using mean-centered independent variables makes estimation of the interactions more efficient, 
and also makes interpretation of the intercept values clear: the expected value of the dependent variable 
when all independent variables are at their means (Aiken and West (1991)). In the end, our model 
specification contains some variables that have only country-level values (such as cultural values and 
investor protection variables), and others that have country-level and firm-level values (such as earnings 
discretion and firm size); where the country-level values are all grand mean-centered and the firm-level 
values are all country mean-centered. 
 
Our Model Specification 
To explore the relation between cultural values and corporate risk-taking, we regress firm-level 
observations of risk-taking in corporate operations on variables that capture firm characteristics,7 country-
level cultural values, and country-level investor protection and economic/institutional development 
variables.  Our HLM specification is as follows, with the intercept term  set as a random coefficient:8
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For firm i from country j, Risk-Taking Measure can be std(ROA), or R&D. This model is 
estimated using an iterative maximum likelihood fitting procedure available in the MLwiN program. 
                                                 
7 Initial values are used for firm size, earnings, and sales growth because of the limited coverage by the Compustat 
Global Vantage database for the years prior to 1997. We would end up with about 3,400 firm-year observations had 
we required a lead-lag specification. 
8 We use a random intercept model with cross-level interactions, allowing the country slopes to vary only in 
combination with the hypothesized conditioning variables, including firm size and earnings discretion. 
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Further, to capture the conditioning effects of earnings discretion and firm size on the relation 
between cultural values and corporate risk-taking, we add six interaction terms to Equation (1): Each of 
the three cultural values interacts with earnings discretion and firm size measured as firm-level 
deviations.  
  
5. Main Results 
Multivariate Tests 
Table 2 presents the estimation results. When std(ROA) is the dependent variable, we show that 
all four firm characteristics measured at the firm-level deviation are significantly associated with risky 
corporate decisions. Greater earnings discretion is associated with greater variability of corporate 
earnings, perhaps because management of earnings reporting is more of a necessity in volatile earnings 
environments.9 Larger firms and firms with higher earnings are associated with lower operating risks. 
Firms with faster sales growth are associated with higher operating risks. Further, there is only one 
country-level effect: Firm size measured at the country-level mean is negatively and significantly 
associated with firm-level risk-taking. Thus, countries with large firms on average are also countries with 
less risky firms on average.  
The coefficients on the three cultural value variables are both significant and with the predicted 
sign: Individualism is positively and significantly associated with firm-level risk-taking, while uncertainty 
avoidance and harmony are negatively and significantly associated with firm-level risk-taking, consistent 
with our first three hypotheses.10 Out of eight country-level institutional variables, there is a negative and 
significant association between creditor rights and firm-level riskiness.  
The economic significance of our cultural values on corporate risk-taking as measured by 
std(ROA) is noteworthy: Assuming a causal relation, a one standard deviation increase in individualism 
increases the risk taking proxy by 22.0% of its mean, a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty 
                                                 
9 Han et al. (2010) show that cultural values directly affect the extent of earnings discretion. By including earnings 
discretion in our model specification, we focus on the direct effects of cultural values on risk-taking, allowing for 
their indirect effects to be subsumed by earnings discretion. 
10 It is worth noting that including the cultural variables one at a time in the regression model does not change their 
significant association with corporate risk-taking (results available upon request). 
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avoidance decreases the risk-taking proxy by 12.8% of its mean, and a one standard deviation increase in 
harmony decreases the risk-taking proxy by 13.0% of its mean. By contrast, a one standard deviation 
increase in creditor rights decreases the risk-taking proxy by 8.0% of its mean.  
When R&D is the dependent variable, we show that among the firm characteristics, both initial 
firm size and initial earnings measured at the firm-level deviation are negatively and significantly 
associated with this measure of corporate risk-taking. A larger firm (a firm with higher earnings) has 
relatively lower R&D expenditures, presumably because of the economies of scale in innovation. Further, 
there is only one country-level effect: Sales growth measured at the country-level mean is positively and 
significantly associated with firm-level risk-taking. 
More importantly, the coefficients on the three cultural value variables are both significant and 
with the predicted sign: Individualism is positively and significantly associated with firm-level risk-
taking, while uncertainty avoidance and harmony are negatively and significantly associated with firm-
level risk-taking. Assuming a causal relation, a one standard deviation increase in individualism increases 
the risk-taking proxy by 23.5% of its mean, a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty avoidance 
decreases the risk-taking proxy by 21.8% of its mean, and a one standard deviation increase in harmony 
decreases the risk-taking proxy by 25.9% of its mean. We also note that there is a negative and significant 
association between creditor rights and R&D. A one standard deviation increase in creditor rights 
decreases the risk-taking proxy by 28.3% of its mean.   
Overall, the three cultural values have consistent effects on corporate risk-taking, supporting our 
hypotheses H1 to H3: There is a positive association between individualism and firm-level riskiness, a 
negative association between uncertainty avoidance and firm-level riskiness, and a negative association 
between harmony and firm-level riskiness. By contrast, due to moderate to high correlations among 
institutional variables (see Table 1 Panel C), each variable has limited explanatory power in predicting 
corporate risk-taking.  
 
Distinguishing the Direct and Indirect Effects of Culture    
The evidence thus far captures only the direct effects of cultural values on risky corporate 
decisions, controlling for all other country-level variables and firm-level variables aggregated at the 
17 
 
country-level. Investigating the specific channels through which cultural values might indirectly affect 
corporate risk-taking (i.e., the estimates of the influence of culture on corporate risk-taking working 
through specific country-level explanatory variables), is also of interest.11 Tabellini (2008) argues that 
cultural values in the distant past give rise to informal institutions that reflect the level of trust in society, 
and these in turn give rise to formal institutions.  Licht et al. (2005, 2007) show that both individualism 
and uncertainty avoidance predict rule of law.  Hope (2003) shows that both legal origin and culture 
predict levels of firm disclosure. We conjecture that firms’ “appetite for risk” may be influenced by both 
their cultural values and these formal institutional outcomes. 
Table 3 Panel A presents the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients between the cultural value 
variables, the investor protection variables, and the economic and institutional development variables.  
Panel B presents the parallel regression results where the three cultural value variables are used as the 
explanatory variables.  
We show that individualism is negatively and significantly related to earnings discretion 
measured at the country-level mean, and GDP growth volatility, and is positively and significantly related 
to rule of law, disclosure, and GDP per capita. Cultures low on individualism emphasize strong group 
cohesion and encourage people to take more responsibility for each other’s well-being; hence they rely 
less on the judicial system. Cultures high on individualism rely on formal institutions to protect individual 
rights. This reliance would predict a positive association between individualism and rule of law (Licht et 
al. (2005)), and between individualism and disclosure (Hope (2003)). Our result in Panel B is consistent 
with this prediction.  
We show that uncertainty avoidance is negatively and significantly related to five out of eight 
country-level institutional variables, and is positively and significantly related to the initial firm size and 
initial sales growth measured at the country-level mean. The cultural concept of uncertainty avoidance 
emphasizes conformity and granting power to authorities, leading to less reliance on formal contracts and 
                                                 
11 This particular analysis assumes a causal chain of influences among culture, formal institutions, and corporate 
risk-taking. As such, causality is assumed but not proven.     
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an avoidance of judicial proceedings if possible (Licht et al. (2005)). Our findings above are consistent 
with that interpretation, as well as with Hope’s finding (2003), which shows that uncertainty avoidance is 
negatively associated with disclosure.  
We show that harmony is positively and significantly related to initial earnings measured at the 
country-level mean, and rule of law, and is negatively and significantly related to the anti-self-dealing 
index, creditor rights, and GDP growth volatility. Cultures high on harmony emphasize adaptation to the 
world as a given, and members of such cultures are uncomfortable with openly challenging the status quo 
and assertively claiming their own rights and privileges. This discomfort is consistent with the finding 
that harmonious cultures are high on rule of law, and low on measures of the protection of minority 
shareholders and creditors in general. 
In summary, the evidence from both the multilevel model (see Table 2) and the country-level 
model (see Table 3) is consistent with our conjecture on the indirect effects of culture that there is a chain 
of influences from cultural values to formal institutions to corporate risk-taking. In our theoretical 
development, we posited that culture has its direct effect primarily at the individual level, on managerial 
decision-making. In contrast, the effects of culture at the country and firm level are indirect effects that 
work through shaping formal institutions and firm-level characteristics. 
 
The Economic Significance of The Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Culture 
To assess the economic significance of the effects of cultural values on risky corporate decisions, 
we examine the consequence of a change in each cultural value on measures of corporate risk-taking. 
Specifically, we first compute the change in individualism (IND) from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile using our sample of 35 countries: IND = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.47. Similarly, we 
compute the change in uncertainty avoidance (UA) from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile: UA = 
75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.38, and the change in harmony (HAR) from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile: HAR = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.57. We then examine the effects on different 
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corporate risk-taking measures as a result of the above specific change in each cultural value in Table 4, 
which decomposes the total effects into direct and indirect effects. 
Row (1) in Table 4 presents the coefficients from the indirect effect regression in Table 3 Panel 
B. Row (2) reports the product of the Row (1) coefficients and the percentile change in individualism: 
IND (uncertainty avoidance: UA, and harmony: HAR, respectively). Row (3) presents the 
coefficients from the direct effect regression in Table 2. Row (4) reports the product of the Row (2) and 
Row (3) coefficients, which is the indirect effect as a result of specified changes in one cultural value. The 
sum of indirect effects is the sum of all coefficients in Row (4). The direct effect is the product of the 
coefficient on individualism (uncertainty avoidance and harmony, respectively), in Table 2 and the 
percentile change in individualism: IND (uncertainty avoidance: UA, and harmony: HAR, 
respectively). The total effect is the sum of the indirect and direct effects. 
Panel A presents the economic significance of the effects of culture on std(ROA). Assuming a 
causal relation, we show that when individualism is increased from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile, the direct effect is to increase std(ROA) by 2.39%, and the indirect effect through firm and 
country characteristics is to decrease std(ROA) by 1.03%. It is worth noting that the direct and indirect 
effects of individualism on std(ROA) are offsetting. The total effect is to increase std(ROA) by 1.36%, 
consistent with our hypothesis H1. Given that the sample mean (median) std(ROA) is 6.20% (4.68%), 
these effects are of clear economic significance.  
For the cultural value of uncertainty avoidance, when it is increased from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile, the direct effect is to decrease std(ROA) by 1.29%, and the indirect effect through firm 
and country characteristics is to decrease std(ROA) by 0.01%. The total effect is to decrease std(ROA) by 
1.30%, consistent with our hypothesis H2.  
For the cultural value of harmony, when it is increased from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile, the direct effect is to decrease std(ROA) by 1.27%, and the indirect effect through firm and 
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country characteristics is to increase std(ROA) by 0.27%. The total effect is to decrease std(ROA) by 
1.00%, consistent with our hypothesis H3.  
Panel B presents the economic significance of the effects of culture on R&D. Assuming a causal 
relation, we show that when individualism is increased from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, the 
direct effect is to increase R&D by 1.16%, and the indirect effect through firm and country characteristics 
is to increase R&D by 0.82%. The total effect is to increase R&D by 1.98%. Given that the sample mean 
(median) ratio of R&D expenses to total assets is 2.83% (0.58%), the direct and indirect effects are of 
economic significance. For the cultural value of uncertainty avoidance, when it is increased from the 25th 
percentile to the 75th percentile, the direct effect is to decrease R&D by 1.01%, and the indirect effect 
through firm and country characteristics is to increase R&D by 0.84%. The direct and indirect effects of 
uncertainty avoidance on R&D are offsetting. The total effect is to decrease R&D by 0.17%. For the 
cultural value of harmony, when it is increased from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, the direct 
effect is to decrease R&D by 1.16%, and the indirect effect through firm and country characteristics is to 
increase R&D by 0.60%. The direct and indirect effects of uncertainty avoidance on R&D are offsetting. 
The total effect is to decrease R&D by 0.56%. 
 
The Roles of Earnings Discretion and Firm Size 
To examine the moderating roles of certain firm characteristics on the influence of cultural values 
on risky corporate decisions, we add cross-level interaction terms between earnings discretion (firm size) 
and our three cultural value measures to Equation (1).  
Table 5 presents the estimation results, including the interaction terms. As expected, the negative 
influence of uncertainty avoidance on risk-taking is strengthened in firms with greater earnings discretion 
when the risk-taking measure is std(ROA), and the positive influence of individualism, and the negative 
influence of harmony on risk-taking, are strengthened in firms with greater earnings discretion when the 
risk-taking measure is R&D, consistent with our hypothesis H4. This result supports the view that 
extensive earnings discretion is a manifestation of enhanced managerial discretion (Han et al. (2010)), 
which in turn facilitates the cultural tendencies of corporate managers towards firm-level risk-taking.   
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As expected, the positive influence of individualism and the negative influences of uncertainty 
avoidance and harmony on risk-taking are mitigated in larger firms, consistent with our hypothesis H5. 
This effect is significant for both risk-taking measures (with the sole exception of harmony when the risk-
taking measure is std(ROA)). These findings support our conjecture that managers in large firms with 
highly disciplined financial management systems are less subject to the influences of their cultural 
backgrounds in corporate risk-taking. Note that the results on firm- and country-level variables including 
our three cultural values remain largely the same when these interaction terms are included. 
Overall, the evidence in Table 5 supports our hypotheses H4 and H5 that certain firm 
characteristics moderate the role of cultural values in corporate risk-taking. Prior studies such as Hope 
(2003) and Han et al. (2010) show that formal institutions can be important conditioning variables for the 
influence of culture. In this paper, we provide new evidence suggesting that in addition to country-level 
formal institutional characteristics, firm characteristics can also be important moderators of culture’s role 
in corporate decisions. 
 
6. Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks 
Naturally, there are alternatives to a simple causal link between the set of firm- and country-level 
explanatory variables that we use and corporate risk-taking.  For example, it is easy to see that earnings 
management and risk-taking may have a bi-directional relationship: Greater earnings discretion may 
promote corporate risk-taking, and widespread risk-taking may promote increased earnings management.  
Furthermore, a country-level variable like GDP per capita might have a similarly bi-directional story: 
Higher incomes may enhance corporate risk-taking, and corporate risk-taking may drive a stronger 
economy overall.  Formal and informal institutions such as rule of law and culture change so slowly that 
they are less plausibly caused by corporate risk-taking across the time horizons that we use here.  Rule of 
law is sufficiently stable that we could use measures from the 1950s to predict corporate risk-taking in the 
first decade of the 21st century; similarly, some of the cultural values that we use to predict the 21st 
century corporate risk-taking were measured in the 1970s. Thus, our variables differ in their susceptibility 
to reverse causation or endogeneity. 
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We address the endogeneity concern about culture by employing the instrumental variable 
approach. Following Kwok and Tadesse (2006), we use three instrumental variables to isolate the 
exogenous components of our cultural values: religion, ethnical fractionalization, and geography. These 
variables are chosen as potential determinants of culture based on theory and data availability. We use the 
percentages of people in the Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Muslim religious faiths in 1980 from La 
Porta et al. (1999) as a proxy for religion. To measure the effect of demography, we use a measure of the 
degree of ethnic heterogeneity in a given country from Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and 
Wacziarg (2003). We use the continent of a country as a proxy for geography. Table 6 Panel A shows that 
the components of the three cultural values predetermined by the more enduring differences in religion, 
ethnic heterogeneity, and geography still have statistically significant effects on corporate risk-taking 
(with the exception that uncertainty avoidance loses its significance when the risk-taking measure is 
R&D). 
As discussed earlier, culture is related to many variables, both observed and unobserved. Our goal 
in this paper is to use measures of cultural values to predict what firms in which cultural settings will be 
more or less averse to risk-taking. Thus, we are not able to precisely rule out firm-specific 
unobservables.12 To address the potential simultaneity between cultural values and country-level 
explanatory variables, we expand our data to multi-periods and adopt a lead-lag specification. Table 6 
Panel B presents the results. We show that the main effects of culture on corporate risk-taking largely 
remain (with the exception that uncertainty avoidance loses its significance on both risk-taking measures).  
We acknowledge that due to different possible risk-sharing mechanisms across countries, what 
we capture as firm-level risk-taking is not necessarily a firm’s true exposure to risk. As a result, different 
measures of corporate risk-taking may show different patterns across cultures. Claessens, Djankov, and 
Nenova (2000) argue that market- versus bank-based financial systems differ in terms of how risk is 
shared among players in the economic system. By adding a measure of financial structure—classifying 
countries as relatively more or less market-based—to our baseline specification, we try to minimize the 
                                                 
12 Typically, firm fixed effects are employed to capture managerial traits, corporate culture, and other unobservable 
characteristics. By their nature, firm fixed effects account for all variance between firms, including between country 
variance, which is required for us to evaluate the effect of culture on corporate risk-taking. Furthermore, as culture is 
time invariant, we are unable to estimate the effect of culture using temporal variation in firm behavior.  
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impact of different risk-sharing mechanisms across countries on our results. Table 6 Panel C presents the 
results when we include firm-level leverage and country-level financial structure variables. We show that 
firm-level leverage is negatively and significantly associated with corporate risk-taking, while country-
level financial structure is not significantly associated with corporate risk-taking. Importantly, we show 
that the main effects of culture on corporate risk-taking largely remain (with the exception that 
uncertainty avoidance loses its significance when the risk-taking measure is R&D).  
Finally, we add two other Hofstede cultural values—power distance and masculinity—to our 
main model specification in Equation (1), and we present the estimation results in Table 6 Panel D. We 
show that the relations between individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and harmony and corporate risk-
taking remain (with the exception that individualism loses its significance when the risk-taking measure is 
R&D), while the two other Hofstede cultural values are not significantly associated with corporate risk-
taking.  
 
7. Conclusions  
In this paper, we present evidence supporting the important role of cultural influences in 
corporate risk-taking, even in the now highly globalized business world. Our paper identifies specific 
economic and psychological channels through which culture exerts its influence on risky corporate 
decision-making. Additionally, our paper provides a novel demonstration of how informal institutions 
such as culture can affect firms’ “appetite for risk” and consequently the riskiness of their corporate 
decisions. It also captures both the direct and indirect influences of culture and establishes boundary 
conditions on the influence of culture on the riskiness of corporate decisions.  
We find that individualism is positively and significantly associated with, whereas uncertainty 
avoidance and harmony are negatively and significantly associated with, corporate risk-taking. 
Furthermore, we demonstrate that culture influences corporate risk-taking in two ways: first, directly on 
risky corporate decision-making; and second, indirectly through formal institutional development, which 
in turn influences risky corporate decision-making. These direct and indirect effects are sometimes 
consistent in sign and reinforcing, while at other times are opposite in sign and offsetting, the direct 
effects of culture. The total effects of each cultural value on corporate risk-taking are in the hypothesized 
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direction and of economic importance. Finally, we find that greater earnings discretion accentuates, while 
larger firm size mitigates, the effects of culture on corporate risk-taking. 
The findings in our paper are relevant to the finance and accounting community. Standard 
economic theories suggest that corporate decisions should be determined only by economic 
considerations such as profit maximization. We show that, in reality, cultural values do often guide the 
way companies from around the world make decisions, leading to decisions that may deviate from 
optimal practice in systematic and geographically predictable ways. As such, our findings can be applied 
to improve international management practice. Overall, our results support a growing awareness among 
finance and accounting scholars that even in increasingly globalized market economies with sophisticated 
professional managers, intangible factors such as culture matter in high-stakes corporate decisions.   
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
 
Country-level cultural value variables: 
 
Individualism: The index is a weighted sum of the following four statements, with the second and third 
items given positive weights and the first and last items given negative weights:   
1) Have sufficient time for your personal or family life  
2) Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate work space, etc.)  
3) Have security of employment  
4) Have an element of variety and adventure in the job 
High individualism is indicated by ratings of “of very little or no importance” to items (2) and (3), and 
ratings of “of utmost importance” to items (1) and (4). Individualism refers to the strength of the ties 
people have to others within the community. A high score on individualism indicates a loose connection 
with people. In countries with a high individualism score, there is a lack of interpersonal connection and 
little sharing of responsibility, beyond family, and perhaps a few close friends. A society with a low 
individualism score would have strong group cohesion, and there would be a large amount of loyalty and 
respect for members of the group. The group itself is also larger, and people take more responsibility for 
each other’s well-being. 
  
Uncertainty avoidance: The index is a weighted sum of the following one question and three statements, 
with the first two items given positive weights and the last two items given negative weights:   
1) How often do you feel nervous or tense at work? 
2) One can be a good manager without having precise answers to most questions that subordinates 
may raise about their work 
3) Competition between employees usually does more harm than good 
4) A company’s or organization’s rules should not be broken—not even when the employee thinks it 
is in the company’s best interest  
High uncertainty avoidance is indicated by answering “always” to the first question, and ratings of 
“strongly disagree” to item (2), and ratings of “strongly agree” to items (3) and (4). Uncertainty avoidance 
captures the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity. 
This feeling leads them to beliefs promising certainty and to maintaining institutions protecting 
conformity. Strong uncertainty avoidance societies maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are 
intolerant towards deviant persons and ideas. Weak uncertainty avoidance societies maintain a more 
relaxed atmosphere in which practice counts more than principles, and deviance is more easily tolerated.  
 
Harmony: The index is an average of the ratings given to the items listed below:  
1) A world at peace (free of war and conflict) 
2) Unity with nature (fitting into nature)                       
3) A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts)  
4) Protecting the environment (preserving nature)                    
In the questionnaire, respondents are to ask themselves: “What values are important to ME as guiding 
principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?”  Using the rating scale, “1” is for rating 
any values opposed to the principles that guide them, and “7” is for rating a value of supreme importance as 
a guiding principle in their lives. (In the parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help 
the respondent to understand its meaning.) High harmony societies accept the world as it is. Groups and 
individuals should fit harmoniously into the natural and social world, avoiding change and self-assertion 
to modify them. 
 
 
Firm-level risk-taking variables: 
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Standard deviation of ROA (std(ROA)): Following John et al. (2008), and Zhang (2009), we compute 
company earnings volatility 
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1 . tcN , indexes the firms within country c and 
year t, and tciEBITDA ,, is defined as depreciation (item #11) plus operating income after depreciation 
(item #14), and tciA ,, is the contemporaneous total assets (item #89). More specifically, for each firm with 
available earnings and total assets for at least five years in 1997-2006, we compute the deviation of the 
firm’s EBITDA/Assets from the country average (for the corresponding year) and then calculate the 
standard deviation of this measure for each firm. tciAdjROA ,, is winsorized at the one percent level in both 
tails of the distribution.  
Source: Compustat Global Vantage Database. 
 
R&D: The average ratio of R&D expenses (item #52) to total assets (item #89) with available data for at 
least five years in 1997-2006. 
Source: Compustat Global Vantage Database. 
 
 
Firm-level control variables: 
 
Earnings discretion: Following Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), and DeFond, Hung, and Trezevanta 
(2007), our measure of earnings discretion is the median ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the 
absolute value of cash flow from operations for each firm. Accruals are calculated as 
DEPTPSTDCLCashCAAccruals  )()( , where CA is total current assets (item #75), 
Cash is cash or cash equivalents (item #60), CL is total current liabilities (item #104), STD is short-term 
debt (item #94), TP is income taxes payable (item #100), and DEP is depreciation (item #11). Operating 
cash flow is equal to operating income after depreciation (item #14) minus accruals.  
Source: Compustat Global Vantage Database. 
 
Initial firm size: The natural logarithm of total assets (item #89) measured in millions of US dollars 
retrieved as of the first year of entry of the company in the sample. 
Source: Compustat Global Vantage Database. 
 
Initial earnings: The ratio of EBITDA (item #11 + item #14) to total assets (item #89) retrieved as of the 
first year of entry of the company in the sample. 
Source: Compustat Global Vantage Database. 
 
Initial sales growth: The sales growth rate as of the first year of entry of the company in the sample. 
Source: Compustat Global Vantage Database. 
 
 
Country-level control variables: 
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Anti-self-dealing index: Aggregation of ex-ante and ex-post private control of self-dealing. Ex-ante 
private control of self-dealing is an index of approval by disinterested shareholders and ex-ante disclosure, 
and ranges from 0 to 4. Ex-post private control of self-dealing is an index of disclosure in periodic filings 
and the ease of proving wrongdoing. It ranges from 0 to 1. The data are from Djankov et al. (2008).  
 
Rule of law: The assessment of the law and order tradition of the country (La Porta et al. (1998)). 
Calculated as the “average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 
1995. The scale is from zero to 10, with lower scores for less tradition of law and order.” 
Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
 
Rating of accounting disclosure standards (Disclosure): This index is created by: “Examining and rating 
companies’ 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items fall into seven 
categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, fund flow statement, accounting 
disclosure standards, stock data, and special items). A minimum of three companies in each country were 
studied (La Porta et al. (1998)).” 
Source: Center for International Financial Analysis and Research.  
 
Creditor rights: The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as the 
creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain 
possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) 
secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the 
assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4 (La Porta et al. (1998)). 
 
Country GDP per capita: The average of annual GDP per capita for the period 1997-2006.  
Source: World Development Indicators at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
 
Country private credit: The average of the ratio of the value of credits by financial intermediaries to the 
private sector to GDP for the period 1997-2006.  
Source: World Development Indicators at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
 
Country market capitalization: The average of the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP for the 
period 1997-2006.  
Source: World Development Indicators at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
 
Country GDP growth volatility: The standard deviation of annual GDP growth rates for the period 1997-
2006. 
Source: World Development Indicators at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. 
 
Religion: The percentage of the population that is Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Muslim in 1980. 
Source: 2000 CIA World Factbook and La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
Ethnical Fractionalization:  The probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population 
belong to different ethnic groups. 
Source: Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003). 
 
Geography: Indicator variables for Africa, America, Asia, and Europe that take the value of one if a 
country is located in one of the continents above, and zero otherwise.  
Source: www.worldatlas.com. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
We present descriptive statistics for key variables. Firm-level variables are retrieved or calculated from the Compustat Global Vantage database for the period 1997-2006. We 
include only firms for which there are at least five annual observations on EBITDA/Assets and enough data for calculating relevant firm-level variables. We have included 
manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2000–3999) only. Our final sample contains 7,250 firms from 35 countries. We winsorize all firm-level variables at the one percent level in 
both tails of the distribution. N is the number of manufacturing companies per country in the sample. See Appendix I for variable definitions. Panel A presents country-level 
summary statistics. Panel B presents firm-level summary statistics. Panel C presents the correlation matrix using firm-level observations. 
 
Panel A: Country-level Summary Statistics 
Country N Std(ROA) R&D Individualism 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Harmony 
Anti-self- 
dealing 
index 
Rule of law Disclosure 
Creditor 
rights 
Country 
GDP  
per capita 
Country 
private credit 
Country 
market 
capitalization 
Country GDP 
growth 
volatility 
               
Argentina 15 5.29 0.03 0.46 0.86 4.27 3.4  5.4 45 1 8.94 17.4 41.9 7.21  
Australia 166 10.81 3.33 0.9 0.51 4.13 7.6  10 75 1 9.98 95 109.6 0.95  
Austria 55 3.63 0.38 0.55 0.7 4.62 2.1  10 54 3 10.09 106.2 27.6 1.03  
Belgium 55 5.23 1.74 0.75 0.94 4.15 5.4  10 61 2 10.03 78.2 74.7 1.11  
Brazil 70 5.64 0.05 0.38 0.76 4.04 2.7  6.3 54 1 8.23 35.7 46.9 1.84  
Canada 97 9.1 7.07 0.8 0.48 4.20 6.4  10 74 1 10.07 146.3 113.8 1.28  
Chile 46 3.58 0.01 0.23 0.86 4.49 6.3  7 52 2 8.55 76 98.5 2.12  
Denmark 81 6.16 3.02 0.74 0.23 4.32 4.6  10 62 3 10.31 126.9 63.7 1.16  
Finland 68 5.82 2.86 0.63 0.59 4.59 4.6  10 77 1 10.09 63.2 139.9 1.64  
France 281 5.54 1.11 0.71 0.86 4.50 3.8  9 69 0 10.02 89.8 84.4 1.00  
Germany 347 6.76 1.66 0.67 0.65 4.70 2.8  9.2 62 3 10.05 113.8 51.3 1.08  
Greece 40 3.71 0.2 0.35 1.12 4.69 2.2  6.2 55 1 9.56 59 70.8 0.61  
Hong Kong 55 7.46 0.11 0.25 0.29 3.61 9.6  8.2 69 4 10.19 151.7 367.7 4.42  
Israel 25 5.67 3.62 0.54 0.81 3.35 7.3  4.8 64 4 9.83 86.6 73.6 2.82  
Italy 132 3.91 0.26 0.76 0.75 4.90 4.2  8.3 62 2 9.86 79.4 48.3 1.07  
Japan 1659 2.67 1.96 0.46 0.92 4.30 5.0  9 65 2 10.53 196.5 78.6 1.48  
Malaysia 382 6.5 0.04 0.26 0.36 3.68 9.5  6.8 76 4 8.29 160.3 144.3 4.67  
Mexico 33 4.18 0 0.3 0.82 4.57 1.7  5.4 60 0 8.68 20.2 28.4 2.36  
Netherlands 81 6.27 1.78 0.8 0.53 4.19 2.0  10 64 2 10.09 149 120.3 1.61  
New Zealand 22 6.39 0.31 0.79 0.49 4.19 9.5  10 70 3 9.52 120.9 40.8 1.54  
Norway 55 7.61 1.28 0.69 0.5 4.63 4.2  10 74 2 10.55 81.8 51.5 1.20  
Peru 10 5.16 0 0.16 0.87 3.91 4.5  2.5 38 0 7.69 22.8 36.5 2.93  
Philippines 39 9.18 0.67 0.32 0.44 4.08 2.2  2.7 65 0 6.94 39.7 42.5 2.13  
Portugal 17 3.05 0 0.27 1.04 4.56 4.4  8.7 36 1 9.29 132.2 45.1 1.95  
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Singapore 176 6.48 0.27 0.2 0.08 3.99 10.0  8.6 78 4 10.06 111 180 4.42  
South Africa 27 6.17 0.36 0.65 0.49 4.15 8.1  4.4 70 3 8.06 127.1 191.3 1.44  
South Korea 159 5.78 1.58 0.18 0.85 3.56 4.7  5.4 62 3 9.36 94.3 61.4 4.45  
Spain 61 4.14 0.07 0.51 0.86 4.65 3.7  7.8 64 2 9.59 117.6 82.8 0.76  
Sweden 117 9.46 4.7 0.71 0.29 4.54 3.3  10 83 2 10.23 100.7 117 1.25  
Switzerland 117 4.83 2.54 0.68 0.58 4.55 2.7  10 68 1 10.44 164.6 258.7 1.24  
Taiwan 651 4.42 2.22 0.17 0.69 4.22 5.6  8.5 65 2 9.57 137.3 118.3 2.47  
Thailand 173 6.64 0.02 0.2 0.64 3.67 8.1  6.3 64 3 7.69 110.4 51 5.23  
Turkey 31 7.66 0.53 0.37 0.85 4.31 4.3  5.2 51 2 8.32 22 32.5 5.83  
UK 393 8.06 3.01 0.89 0.35 3.82 9.5  8.6 78 4 10.13 146 151.9 0.66  
US 1514 9.87 6.83 0.91 0.46 3.69 6.5  10 71 1 10.46 181.3 142.8 1.25  
               
Total 7250 6.2 2.83 0.58 0.63 4.22 5.8 8.8 68 2 9.97 148.6 109.2 1.86 
      
 
Panel B: Firm-level Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean StdDev 5th Percentile Median 95th Percentile 
      
Std(ROA) 6.20 5.16 1.24 4.68 17.67 
R&D 2.83 5.43 0.00 0.58 14.66 
Earnings discretion 0.699 0.486 0.186 0.579 1.628 
Initial firm size 5.224 1.768 2.562 5.095 8.478 
Initial earnings 9.68 13.85 -12.21 10.58 26.97 
Initial sales growth 92.36 457.2 -0.996 -0.125 322.2 
  
 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix Using Firm-level Observations 
 
Std(ROA) R&D Earnings discretion 
Initial 
firm size 
Initial 
earnings 
Initial 
sales 
growth 
Individualism Uncertainty avoidance Harmony 
Anti-self- 
dealing 
index 
Rule of 
law Disclosure 
Creditor 
rights 
Country 
GDP per 
capita 
Country 
private 
credit 
Country 
market 
capitali-
zation 
Country 
GDP 
growth 
volatility 
 
Std(ROA) 1.000                 
                  
R&D 0.451  1.000                
 (0.000)                 
Earnings discretion 0.218 0.074  1.000               
 (0.000) (0.000)                
Initial firm size -0.365  -0.198  -0.236  1.000              
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)               
Initial earnings  -0.312  -0.443  -0.188  0.219  1.000             
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)              
Initial sales growth -0.072  -0.030  -0.026  0.124  0.032  1.000            
 (0.000) (0.010) (0.026) (0.000) (0.006)             
Individualism 0.351  0.314  -0.130  0.035  -0.049  -0.048  1.000           
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)            
Uncertainty avoidance -0.407  -0.158  -0.038  0.222  0.000  0.119  -0.346  1.000          
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.988) (0.000) (0.000)           
Harmony -0.312 -0.208 0.004 0.080 0.035 0.067 -0.175 0.524 1.000         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.717) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)          
Anti-self-dealing index 0.201  0.053  0.035  -0.195  -0.035  -0.071  0.019  -0.610  -0.710 1.000        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000)         
Rule of law 0.146  0.273  -0.056  0.023  -0.088  -0.036  0.653  -0.157  0.108 -0.109  1.000       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
Disclosure 0.293  0.157  -0.007  -0.183  -0.049  -0.078  0.374  -0.711  -0.425 0.633 0.286  1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.551) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Creditor rights -0.098  -0.216  0.072 -0.124  0.045  -0.010  -0.396  -0.279  -0.118 0.490  -0.393  0.179  1.000     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.420) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
Country GDP per capita -0.004  0.226  -0.095  0.146  -0.086  0.027  0.534  0.134  0.165 -0.219  0.816  0.128  -0.324  1.000    
 (0.764)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)      
Country private credit -0.059  0.184  -0.049  0.110  -0.084  0.009  0.165  0.093  -0.297 0.205 0.443  0.178  -0.034  0.543  1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.451) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)     
Country market capitalization 0.235  0.155  0.014  -0.107  -0.024  -0.082  0.212  -0.636  -0.483 0.537  0.247  0.599  0.079  0.133  0.255  1.000  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.229) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   
Country GDP growth volatility -0.051  -0.197  0.113  -0.120  0.061  -0.017  -0.702  -0.164  -0.348 0.387  -0.670  -0.030  0.474  -0.708 -0.219  0.078  1.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.145) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
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Table 2. Explaining Corporate Risk-Taking 
 
This table presents the estimation results under the HLM specification. Our final sample contains 7,250 firms 
from 35 countries. See Appendix I for variable definitions. The HLM specification employs independent 
variables that are decomposed into firm-level deviations (_firmdev) and country-level means (_ctrymean) for 
the firm-level variables and grand-mean centered country-level deviations (_ctry) for the country-level variables. 
Two-digit industry fixed effects are included, but are not reported. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Std(ROA)    R&D  
  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry 
Firm Characteristics         
Earnings discretion  1.493*** 0.092   0.025 -1.240  
  (0.098) (1.987)   (0.103) (1.933)  
Initial firm size  -0.679*** -0.856**   -0.325*** -0.057  
  (0.029) (0.399)   (0.031) (0.388)  
Initial earnings  -0.085*** -0.010   -0.140*** -0.009  
  (0.003) (0.047)   (0.004) (0.045)  
Initial sales growth  1.717* 16.70   1.452 40.03**  
  (0.987) (19.62)   (1.042) (19.12)  
Country Characteristics         
Individualism    5.074***    2.471** 
    (1.211)    (1.178) 
Uncertainty avoidance    -3.390**    -2.647** 
    (1.237)    (1.195) 
Harmony    -2.229***    -2.030*** 
    (0.758)    (0.732) 
Anti-self-dealing index    -0.134    -0.051 
    (0.123)    (0.119) 
Rule of law    0.038    0.085 
    (0.197)    (0.193) 
Disclosure    0.029    0.014 
    (0.027)    (0.026) 
Creditor rights    -0.453**    -0.737*** 
    (0.204)    (0.197) 
Country GDP per capita    -0.560    0.343 
    (0.390)    (0.378) 
Country private credit    -0.009    0.007 
    (0.006)    (0.005) 
Country market capitalization    0.127    -0.481 
    (0.338)    (0.327) 
Country GDP growth volatility    0.282    0.095 
    (0.180)    (0.177) 
Intercept    5.105***    1.219*** 
    (0.280)    (0.273) 
         
Number of Observations    7,250    7,250 
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Table 3. The Indirect Effects of Culture  
 
This table presents the country-level analysis of the indirect effects of cultural values on corporate risk-taking. See Appendix I for variable definitions. Panel A presents the 
pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients between cultural values and other country-level variables included in Table 2. P-values are presented in parentheses. Panel B 
presents the regression results using cultural values as the explanatory variables.  Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Correlations 
 Anti-self-dealing 
index Rule of law Disclosure Creditor rights 
Country GDP per 
capita 
Country private 
credit 
Country market 
capitalization 
Country GDP growth 
volatility 
         
Individualism -0.005 0.624 *** 0.456*** -0.029 0.584*** 0.298* 0.060 -0.606*** 
 (0.978) (0.000) (0.006) (0.868) (0.002) (0.082) (0.732) (0.000) 
Uncertainty avoidance -0.485*** -0.310* -0.712*** -0.438*** -0.193 -0.390** -0.517*** -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.070) (0.000) (0.009) (0.267) (0.021) (0.002) (0.969) 
Harmony -0.613*** 0.333* -0.155 -0.418** 0.229 -0.198 -0.281 -0.464*** 
 (0.000) (0.051) (0.375) (0.013) (0.187) (0.255) (0.102) (0.005) 
         
Number of Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
 
Panel B: Explaining Firm-level and Country-level Characteristics Using Cultural Values 
 
Earnings 
discretion 
Initial 
firm size 
Initial 
earnings 
Initial 
sales 
growth 
Anti-self-
dealing index 
Rule of 
law Disclosure 
Creditor 
rights 
Country 
GDP per 
capita 
Country 
private 
credit 
Country 
market 
capitalization 
Country 
GDP 
growth 
volatility 
             
Individualism -0.200** 0.191 -5.304 -0.003 0.171 4.506*** 13.163** -0.341 2.059*** 51.097 -0.138 -3.743*** 
 (0.091) (0.489) (3.384) (0.008) (1.458) (1.309) (5.688) (0.842) (0.614) (33.812) (0.484) (0.955) 
             
Uncertainty avoidance -0.136 1.380*** 1.507 0.025*** -3.370** -2.392* -27.275*** -1.863** -0.332 -51.089 -1.416*** -0.447 
 (0.092) (0.493) (3.408) (0.008) (1.468) (1.318) (5.729) (0.848) (0.618) (34.052) (0.487) (0.962) 
             
Harmony -0.006 0.045 4.109* 0.003 -3.411*** 1.779** -1.204 -0.959* 0.342 -22.052 -0.242 -1.398** 
 (0.058) (0.313) (2.161) (0.005) (0.931) (0.836) (3.632) (0.538) (0.392) (21.592) (0.301) (0.610) 
             
Constant -0.028 0.030 0.817 0.001 -0.160 -0.894*** -2.913** 0.098 -0.426*** -40.886*** -0.089 0.328 
 (0.022) (0.118) (0.817) (0.002) (0.352) (0.316) (1.374) (0.203) (0.148) (8.168) (0.117) (0.231) 
             
Number of Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.43 0.44 0.54 0.22 0.30 0.14 0.22 0.44 
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Table 4. The Economic Significance of Culture 
 
To assess the economic significance of the effects of cultural values on corporate risk-taking, we first compute the change in individualism (IND) from the 25th percentile to 
the 75th percentile using our sample of 35 countries, and IND = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.47. Similarly, we compute the change in uncertainty avoidance (UA) 
from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile using our sample of 35 countries, and UA = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.38. We compute the change in harmony (HAR) 
from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile using our sample of 35 countries, and HAR = 75th percentile – 25th percentile = 0.57. Row (1) in each table below presents 
the coefficients from the indirect effect regression in Table 3 Panel B. Row (2) reports the product of the Row (1) coefficients and the percentile change in individualism–
IND (uncertainty avoidance–UA, and harmony–HAR, respectively). Row (3) displays the coefficients from the direct effect regression in Table 2. Row (4) presents the 
product of the Row (2) and Row (3) coefficients that is the indirect effect due to specified changes in a cultural value. The sum of indirect effects is the sum of all coefficients 
in Row (4). The direct effect is the product of the coefficient on individualism (uncertainty avoidance and harmony, respectively) in Table 2 and the percentile change in 
individualism–IND (uncertainty avoidance–UA, and harmony–HAR, respectively). The total effect is the sum of indirect and direct effects.  Panel A presents the 
economic significance of the effects of culture on std(ROA). Panel B presents the economic significance of the effects of culture on R&D.   
 
Panel A: The Economic Significance of the Effects of Culture on Std(ROA) 
 
Earnings 
discretion 
Initial firm 
size 
Initial 
earnings 
Initial 
sales 
growth 
Anti-self- 
dealing index 
Rule of 
law Disclosure 
Creditor 
rights 
Country 
GDP per 
capita 
Country 
private 
credit 
Country  
market 
capitalization 
Country 
GDP 
growth 
volatility 
Sum of 
Indirect 
Effects 
Direct 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
                
Individualism                
(1) -0.200  0.191  -5.304  -0.003  0.171  4.506  13.163  -0.341  2.059  51.097  -0.138  -3.743     
(2)=(1)*IND -0.094  0.090  -2.493  -0.001  0.080  2.118  6.187  -0.160  0.968  24.016  -0.065  -1.759     
                
(3) 0.092  -0.856  -0.010  16.700  -0.134  0.038  0.029  -0.453  -0.560  -0.009  0.127  0.282   5.074   
(4)=(2)*(3) -0.009  -0.077  0.025  -0.024  -0.011  0.080  0.179  0.073  -0.542  -0.216  -0.008  -0.496  -1.025  2.385  1.360  
                
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
               
(1) -0.136  1.380  1.507  0.025  -3.370  -2.392  -27.275  -1.863  -0.332  -51.089  -1.416  -0.447     
(2)=(1)*UA -0.052  0.524  0.573  0.010  -1.281  -0.909  -10.365  -0.708  -0.126  -19.414  -0.538  -0.170     
                
(3) 0.092  -0.856  -0.010  16.700  -0.134  0.038  0.029  -0.453  -0.560  -0.009  0.127  0.282   -3.390   
(4)=(2)*(3) -0.005  -0.449  -0.006  0.159  0.172  -0.035  -0.301  0.321  0.071  0.175  -0.068  -0.048  -0.014  -1.288  -1.303  
                
Harmony                
(1) -0.006  0.045  4.109  0.003  -3.411  1.779  -1.204  -0.959  0.342  -22.052  -0.242  -1.398     
(2)=(1)*HAR -0.003  0.026  2.342  0.002  -1.944  1.014  -0.686  -0.547  0.195  -12.570  -0.138  -0.797     
                
(3) 0.092  -0.856  -0.010  16.700  -0.134  0.038  0.029  -0.453  -0.560  -0.009  0.127  0.282   -2.229   
(4)=(2)*(3) 0.000  -0.022  -0.023  0.029  0.261  0.039  -0.020  0.248  -0.109  0.113  -0.018  -0.225  0.271  -1.271  -0.999  
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Panel B: The Economic Significance of the Effects of Culture on R&D 
 
 
Earnings 
discretion 
Initial 
firm size 
Initial 
earnings 
Initial 
sales 
growth 
Anti-self- 
dealing index 
Rule of 
law Disclosure 
Creditor 
rights 
Country 
GDP per 
capita 
Country 
private 
credit 
Country  
market 
capitalization 
Country 
GDP 
growth 
volatility 
Sum of 
Indirect 
Effects 
Direct 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
                
Individualism                
(1) -0.200  0.191  -5.304  -0.003  0.171  4.506  13.163  -0.341  2.059  51.097  -0.138  -3.743     
(2)=(1)*IND -0.094  0.090  -2.493  -0.001  0.080  2.118  6.187  -0.160  0.968  24.016  -0.065  -1.759     
                
(3) -1.240  -0.057  -0.009  40.030  -0.051  0.085  0.014  -0.737  0.343  0.007  -0.481  0.095   2.471   
(4)=(2)*(3) 0.117  -0.005  0.022  -0.056  -0.004  0.180  0.087  0.118  0.332  0.168  0.031  -0.167  0.822  1.161  1.984  
                
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
               
(1) -0.136  1.380  1.507  0.025  -3.370  -2.392  -27.275  -1.863  -0.332  -51.089  -1.416  -0.447     
(2)=(1)*UA -0.052  0.524  0.573  0.010  -1.281  -0.909  -10.365  -0.708  -0.126  -19.414  -0.538  -0.170     
                
(3) -1.240  -0.057  -0.009  40.030  -0.051  0.085  0.014  -0.737  0.343  0.007  -0.481  0.095   -2.647   
(4)=(2)*(3) 0.064  -0.030  -0.005  0.380  0.065  -0.077  -0.145  0.522  -0.043  -0.136  0.259  -0.016  0.838  -1.006  -0.168  
                
Harmony                
(1) -0.006  0.045  4.109  0.003  -3.411  1.779  -1.204  -0.959  0.342  -22.052  -0.242  -1.398     
(2)=(1)*HAR -0.003  0.026  2.342  0.002  -1.944  1.014  -0.686  -0.547  0.195  -12.570  -0.138  -0.797     
                
(3) -1.240  -0.057  -0.009  40.030  -0.051  0.085  0.014  -0.737  0.343  0.007  -0.481  0.095   -2.030   
(4)=(2)*(3) 0.004  -0.001  -0.021  0.068  0.099  0.086  -0.010  0.403  0.067  -0.088  0.066  -0.076  0.598  -1.157  -0.559  
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Table 5. The Interaction Effects 
   
This table presents the interaction effects based on the model and the sample used in Table 2. See 
Appendix I for variable definitions. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
   Std(ROA)    R&D  
  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry 
Firm Characteristics         
Earnings discretion  1.397*** 0.122   0.045 -1.177  
  (0.100) (1.990)   (0.104) (1.937)  
Initial firm size  -0.645*** -0.852**   -0.273*** -0.052  
  (0.030) (0.399)   (0.031) (0.389)  
Initial earnings  -0.079*** -0.009   -0.128*** -0.009  
  (0.004) (0.046)   (0.004) (0.045)  
Initial sales growth  1.716 16.85   1.139 39.94**  
  (0.981) (19.65)   (1.023) (19.16)  
Country Characteristics         
Individualism    5.072***    2.468** 
    (1.213)    (1.181) 
Uncertainty avoidance    -3.396***    -2.631** 
    (1.240)    (1.200) 
Harmony    -2.226***    -2.034*** 
    (0.759)    (0.735) 
Anti-self-dealing index    -0.133    0.050 
    (0.124)    (0.120) 
Rule of law    0.040    0.079 
    (0.197)    (0.193) 
Disclosure    0.029    0.015 
    (0.027)    (0.026) 
Creditor rights    -0.457**    -0.739*** 
    (0.205)    (0.198) 
Country GDP per capita    -0.468    0.363 
    (0.434)    (0.379) 
Country private credit    -0.009*    0.007 
    (0.005)    (0.005) 
Country market capitalization    0.125    -0.480 
    (0.339)    (0.329) 
Country GDP growth volatility    0.285    0.098 
    (0.180)    (0.177) 
Interactions         
Earnings discretion  ×  Individualism    -0.392    2.057*** 
    (0.338)    (0.352) 
Earnings discretion  × Uncertainty avoidance    -2.015***    0.189 
    (0.497)    (0.518) 
Earnings discretion  × Harmony    -0.537    -2.238*** 
    (0.338)    (0.352) 
Initial firm size × Individualism    -0.408***    -0.400*** 
    (0.123)    (0.128) 
Initial firm size × Uncertainty avoidance    0.487***    0.267* 
    (0.155)    （0.161） 
Initial firm size × Harmony    0.028    0.563*** 
    (0.085)    （0.089） 
Intercept    5.168***    1.304*** 
    (0.280)    (0.274) 
         
Number of Observations    7,250    7,250 
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Table 6. Robustness Checks 
 
This table presents robustness checks on our main results. See Appendix I for variable definitions. Panel A 
employs three instrumental variables: religion, ethnical fractionalization, and geography for cultural values. 
Panel B employs panel data based on three periods: 1997-2001, 2002-2006, and 2007-2011 and a lead-lag 
specification. Except the country-level variables with a time subscript, all other country-level variables are time 
invariant. Period 2 and Period 3 are indicator variables for the second (2002-2006) and third (2007-2011) periods, 
respectively. Panel C adds leverage and financial structure to the baseline model in Table 2. Panel D includes all 
four Hofstede cultural values. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Using Religion, Ethnical Fractionalization, and Geography as Instrumental Variables 
 
 
  
   Std(ROA)    R&D  
  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry 
Firm Characteristics         
Earnings discretion  1.493*** 4.175   0.026 0.714  
  (0.098) (2.696)   (0.103) (2.779)  
Initial firm size  -0.678*** 0.023   -0.325*** 0.318  
  (0.029) (0.477)   (0.031) (0.492)  
Initial  earnings   -0.085*** -0.085*   -0.140*** -0.072  
  (0.003) (0.046)   (0.004) (0.047)  
Initial sales growth  1.717* -11.41   1.452 11.20  
  (0.987) (19.20)   (1.042) (19.80)  
Country Characteristics         
Individualism    7.272***    3.495* 
    (2.192)    (2.061) 
Uncertainty avoidance    -3.445**    -1.513 
    (1.294)    (1.330) 
Harmony    -2.481***    -1.377* 
    (0.746)    (0.763) 
Anti-self-dealing index    0.013    0.055 
    (0.126)    (0.129) 
Rule of law    -0.343    -0.207 
    (0.222)    (0.229) 
Disclosure    0.126***    0.073*** 
    (0.026)    (0.027) 
Creditor rights    -0.691***    -0.791*** 
    (0.214)    (0.220) 
Country GDP per capita    -0.339    0.506 
    (0.401)    (0.414) 
Country private credit    0.008    0.017** 
    (0.006)    (0.007) 
Country market capitalization    -0.700*    -0.852** 
    (0.360)    (0.371) 
Country GDP growth volatility    0.549**    0.287 
    (0.190)    (0.197) 
Intercept    5.983    1.666*** 
    (0.370)    (0.382) 
         
Number of Observations    7,250    7,250 
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Panel B: Panel Structure with a Lead-Lag Specification to Explain Corporate Risk-Taking   
 
 
  
   Std(ROA)t    R&Dt  
  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry 
Firm Characteristics         
Earnings discretiont-1  0.044*** -0.265   -0.060*** 0.229  
  (0.014) (0.180)   (0.013) (0.168)  
Firm sizet-1  -0.559*** -0.415***   -0.074** -0.143**  
  (0.032) (0.073)   (0.030) (0.067)  
Earningst-1   -0.220*** -0.220***   -0.254*** -0.102***  
  (0.004) (0.034)   (0.004) (0.032)  
Sales growtht-1  0.370*** 1.471***   1.675*** 1.302***  
  (0.085) (0.437)   (0.080) (0.410)  
Country Characteristics         
Individualism    2.671**    3.460*** 
    (1.154)    (1.003) 
Uncertainty avoidance    0.901    0.465 
    (1.312)    (1.144) 
Harmony    -1.526**    -1.657** 
    (0.747)    (0.646) 
Anti-self-dealing index    0.102    -0.102 
    (0.133)    (0.116) 
Rule of law    0.371    0.185 
    (0.201)    (0.176) 
Disclosure    0.050    0.015 
    (0.032)    (0.028) 
Creditor rights    -0.090    -0.351 
    (0.234)    (0.203) 
Country GDP per capitat-1    -0.720    0.165 
    (0.432)    (0.376) 
Country private creditt-1    -0.020***    -0.002 
    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Country market capitalizationt-1    -0.216    0.013 
    (0.231)    (0.214) 
Country GDP growth volatilityt-1    0.231***    0.023 
    (0.057)    (0.053) 
Period 2    -0.307**    0.020 
    (0.142)    (0.132) 
Period 3    -0.451***    0.109 
    (0.154)    (0.143) 
Intercept    4.743***    1.231*** 
    (0.324)    (0.288) 
         
Number of Observations    13,939    13,939 
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Panel C: Adding Firm-level Leverage and Country-level Financial Structure to Explain Corporate Risk-Taking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   Std(ROA)    R&D  
  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry 
Firm Characteristics         
Earnings discretion  1.500*** 0.029   0.108 -0.642  
  (0.098) (2.033)   (0.100) (1.706)  
Initial firm size  -0.667*** -0.836**   -0.178*** 0.111  
  (0.030) (0.395)   (0.031) (0.330)  
Initial earnings  -0.086*** -0.013   -0.147*** -0.009  
  (0.004) (0.046)   (0.004) (0.038)  
Initial leverage  -0.004*** -0.022   -0.045*** -0.088***  
  (0.002) (0.035)   (0.002) (0.029)  
Initial sales growth  1.721* 16.00   1.502 32.63*  
  (0.986) (20.10)   (1.014) (16.78)  
Country Characteristics         
Individualism    5.360***    3.183*** 
    (1.220)    (1.018) 
Uncertainty avoidance    -2.916**    -1.076 
    (1.347)    (1.111) 
Harmony    -2.228***    -2.283*** 
    (0.775)    (0.635) 
Anti-self-dealing index    -0.173    -0.221* 
    (0.143)    (0.117) 
Rule of law    0.066    0.198 
    (0.197)    (0.167) 
Disclosure    0.030    0.032 
    (0.029)    (0.023) 
Creditor rights    -0.326    -0.320 
    (0.247)    (0.202) 
Country GDP per capita    -0.550    0.258 
    (0.389)    (0.321) 
Country private credit    -0.011*    0.004 
    (0.006)    (0.005) 
Country market capitalization    0.073    -0.469 
    (0.367)    (0.304) 
Country GDP growth volatility    0.261    0.041 
    (0.179)    (0.153) 
Country financial structure    0.148    0.078 
    (0.287)    (0.232) 
Intercept    5.122***    1.265*** 
    (0.276)    (0.234) 
         
Number of Observations    7,250    7,250 
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Panel D: Using Four Hofstede Cultural Values to Explain Corporate Risk-Taking 
 
   Std(ROA)    R&D  
  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry  _firmdev _ctrymean _ctry 
Firm Characteristics         
Earnings discretion  1.493*** -0.235   0.026  0.260 
  (0.098) (2.154)   (0.103)  (1.947) 
Initial firm size  -0.678*** -1.009**   -0.326***  0.040 
  (0.029) (0.436)   (0.031)  (0.394) 
Initial earnings  -0.085*** 0.011   -0.140***  0.026 
  (0.003) (0.051)   (0.004)  (0.047) 
Initial sales growth  1.718* 31.82   1.452  43.82* 
  (0.987) (25.64)   (1.042)  (23.26) 
Country Characteristics         
Individualism   4.762***     1.515 
   (1.297)     (1.166) 
Uncertainty avoidance   -3.844***     -2.327* 
   (1.365)     (1.217) 
Harmony   -2.649***     -2.088*** 
   (0.881)     (0.791) 
Power distance   -0.506     -2.022 
   (1.352)     (1.215) 
Masculinity   1.176     0.389 
   (1.276)     (1.154) 
Anti-self-dealing index   -0.182     0.015 
   (0.141)     (0.127) 
Rule of law   0.165     0.114 
   (0.241)     (0.223) 
Disclosure   0.031     0.036 
   (0.028)     (0.026) 
Creditor rights   -0.493**     -0.925*** 
   (0.221)     (0.196) 
Country GDP per capita   -0.720**     0.015 
   (0.430)     (0.388) 
Country private credit   -0.012**     0.008 
   (0.006)     (0.006) 
Country market capitalization   0.184     -0.392 
   (0.340)     (0.305) 
Country GDP growth volatility   0.314*     0.097 
   (0.181)     (0.167) 
Intercept   5.119***     1.220*** 
   (0.277)     (0.253) 
         
Number of Observations   7,250     7,250 
